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1. Introduction 
 
When casually contemplating the intricacies of improving the standard of living in developing 
and emerging economies, the terms „growth‟, „uncertainty‟ and „crisis‟ are among the first 
that come to mind. To improve standards of living, economic growth is a necessity. The 
outcomes of the policies devised for achieving growth are subject to all kinds of uncertainties. 
And if things fail to work out as planned, one may end up with a full blown economic crisis. 
A particularly powerful combination of growth, uncertainty and crisis has been provided by 
East Asia. After a prolonged period of extraordinarily high growth, in 1997 a sudden and 
unexpected boot of uncertainty led to the reversal of international financial flows and caused 
an unprecedented crisis. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a coherent framework in which the main 
characteristics of growth, uncertainty and crisis are connected. Within this framework, we 
find that these issues, which were so prominent in East Asia, are consequences of the chosen 
development strategy. Thus, we identify a fundamental mechanism that relates the high levels 
of per capita growth in the East Asian countries before the crisis, its fall during the crisis and 
the more modest growth rates thereafter. We address the question whether or not crises can be 
prevented in the process of economic development and, if so, whether it is desirable to do so.  
 
The approach of this paper differs from the usual perspective on the East Asian crisis which 
relates to the well established literature on currency crises. In this literature, different 
mechanisms that may trigger a currency crisis are identified, often with the intention of 
developing early warning systems as to when a crisis may be immanent. The different types 
of mechanisms are distinguished in different “generations” of models. The first generation 
models follow the seminal paper by Krugman (1979), according to which a currency crisis 
occurs when the specified dynamics make such a crisis inevitable. The second generation 
models, in the spirit of Obstfeld (1986, 1996), argue that some crises are not inevitable, but 
rather the consequence of a self fulfilling prophecy, i.e. of equilibrium selection and 
coordination problems. More recently, third generation models following Morris and Shin 
(1998) remove the multiple equilibrium aspects by assuming a lack of common knowledge 
among investors. In the survey article of Breuer (2005), a fourth generation of models is 
identified, which focus on institutions and loss of confidence as potential causes. 
 
In many respects, the above mentioned research relates to models of bank runs in the spirit of 
Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), in which bank runs are suboptimal and 
should be prevented. The desirability of preventing bank runs in a setting with risky assets, 
however, has recently been challenged by Allen and Gale (1998) and Spanjers (1999/08, 
Chapter 3). When the likelihood of a bank run is low and its costs are limited, while the 
opportunity costs of preventing a bank run are high, it is better to accept the occasional 
occurrence of bank runs, rather preventing them. 
 
In this setting the impact of incalculable risk, also known as Knightian uncertainty or 
ambiguity, is analyzed by Spanjers (1999/08, Chapter 5). The typical results in the presence of 
calculable risk are confirmed. But in addition it is found that the updating of ambiguous 
beliefs regarding returns introduces dynamic inconsistency in the behaviour of investors. 
When banks choose their reserve policies, it is difficult for them to distinguish between 
investors being exposed to subjective calculable risk and investors facing ambiguity. If banks 
wrongly interpret the investors to be exposed to calculable risks when they actually face 
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incalculable ambiguity, the dynamic inconsistency appears to cause investors to “overreact” 
and “panic” in the face of bad news, unexpectedly causing a bank run.  
 
Spanjers (1998/09) shows that these results also hold for currency crises. In particular, it is 
shown that the stylized facts of the East Asian crisis match the mechanisms and conclusions 
of the model. It is argued that the crisis was shaped by a loss of confidence of investors, 
caused by a combination of perceived incompetence of key policy makers, bad news, and 
incalculable political risk. In the language of the model, the dynamic inconsistency associated 
with the incalculable risks wrong-footed central banks, which were not aware of its presence. 
Investors seemed to “overreact” and to “panic”, reversing international financial flows to an 
extent that was previously unimaginable. For a comprehensive description of the East Asian 
crisis see Williamson (2004). 
 
The current paper takes a different approach to the East Asian crisis. Rather than modelling 
the investment opportunities as high yielding illiquid assets, the analysis is based on different 
strategies for economic growth and development. It incorporates the impact of globalisation, 
recognizing the effects of both international financial liberalization and of the internal and 
external increasing returns to scale that characterize modern production technologies. In 
particular, the effects of a low technology development strategy are compared to those of a 
high technology strategy. 
 
In line with modern decision theory, the uncertainty involved in development strategies for 
emerging countries is understood to include both (calculable) risk and (incalculable) 
ambiguity in the tradition of Knight (1921) and Keynes (1909/21). Decision making under 
ambiguity is modelled a by basic version of the approach pioneered by Schmeidler (1982/89). 
A prominent area of recent economic applications of ambiguity and incalculable risk is 
monetary policy. Ghatak and Spanjers (2007) discuss the impact of ambiguity on monetary 
policy rules in transition economies; in a more general monetary policy context applications 
can be found in e.g. Hansen and Sargent (2003, 2007), Levine and Pearlman (2008) and 
Spanjers (2008). 
 
In the setting of the current paper we analyse the impact of ambiguity on the decision which 
development strategy to follow. Here ambiguity can take the form of incalculable political 
risk or of unpredictable reverses of international financial flows. Our theoretical analysis 
indicates that risk neutral but ambiguity averse investors and policy makers may be tempted 
to implement a low technology development strategy in the face of ambiguity, where a high 
technology strategy would be appropriate. 
 
A brief examination of growth rates of per capita GDP for selected countries from East Asia 
and other parts of the world illustrates the theoretical argument. This leads to policy 
recommendations that focus on either reducing incalculable risks or insulating the high 
technology strategy from its impact. The recommendations not only question the 
appropriateness of what seems to be a cautious economic development strategy in the selected 
East Asian countries. It also highlights the importance of reducing the incalculable political 
risks in the Middle East and in Russia. Regarding the incalculable risk of a reversal of 
financial flows, a combination of high currency reserves and appropriate reform of the IMF is 
recommended. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses agglomeration and 
cluster effects and describes the basic features of both a low technology and a high technology 
development strategy. In Section 3 an intuition for ambiguity is provided, along with a basic 
4 
 
description of the associated decision-theoretical model. The implications of ambiguity in the 
presence of decreasing and increasing returns to scale are also discussed. Section 4 focuses on 
the analysis of the growth rates generated by the two development strategies. In this context 
the behaviour of risk neutral but ambiguity averse policy makers and investors is discussed 
and analyzed, followed by a brief examination of the per capita growth rates of selected 
countries over the period 1975 – 2005. The final section, Section 5, contains policy 
recommendations. 
 
 
 
2. Agglomeration Effects and Development Strategies 
 
The breathtaking development of the Asian “tiger” economies during the past three decades 
benefited strongly from the process of globalisation. Indeed, the international economy as a 
whole has been subject to momentous changes, some triggered by globalisation, some fuelling 
it. Changes in the international institutional structure did much to support global economic 
integration, but the forces that were released are of a more fundamental nature. 
 
Globalisation can best be understood as a reaction on fundamental changes caused by 
technological progress. It is the shift from production technologies that exhibit internal and 
external decreasing returns to scale to technologies that are characterized by internal and 
external increasing returns to scale that has shaped the ongoing processes of economic 
globalisation. The “Asian experience” provides an excellent illustration of this. 
 
Of course, external increasing returns to scale in the form of agglomeration and cluster effects 
were relevant for past processes of economic development. But the reasons for agglomeration 
were more strongly linked to the proximity to specific resources or the presence of 
geographical features. Geographical features could provide a location advantage in terms of 
protection against destruction by wars or in terms of the ease with which a cost effective 
transportation infrastructure could be provided. For more recent technological progress, 
agglomeration and cluster effects are no longer linked to exogenously given geographical 
structures. Rather, they are endogenous results of the choice of location of production sites. 
This is the distinguishing feature between the “old” and the “new” economic geography, as 
discussed, amongst others and from different perspectives, in Neary (2001), McCann and 
Shefer (2005) and Fujita and Mori (2005). 
 
The agglomeration and cluster effects related to external increasing returns to scale are driven 
by direct and indirect positive externalities of production. Such synergy effects may range 
from the efficient use of local physical infrastructure to the availability of a pool of skilled 
labour. But they may also relate to the ease with which communication may take place, 
improving the functioning of financial markets and facilitating cooperation in research and 
development. The success of the financial centres of, for example, New York, London and 
Hong Kong is an illustration of how powerful agglomeration and cluster effects can be for 
financial markets. Silicon Valley is an example of their potential impact in the area of 
research and development. Many more examples can be found that illustrate the potential 
advantages of geographically concentrating the production of specific sectors. 
 
When contemplating which path to follow for developing their economies, policy makers are 
aware of the importance of external increasing returns to scale. But there still are trade-offs to 
be made, as strategies that aim to exploit external economies of scale may have disadvantages 
in other respects. 
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For simplicity, we consider only two proto-typical economic development strategies: a low 
technology strategy and a high technology strategy. As indicated below, these development 
strategies differ with respect to internal and external economies to scale, financial 
requirements, governmental policies, and vulnerability to calculable and incalculable risks.  
The government chooses which policy to pursue with the instruments available to them. 
 
Low technology strategy 
 
The first development strategy is of a more traditional nature and focuses on established low 
technology sectors, of which agriculture is an important example. Such technologies typically 
have either decreasing internal returns to scale or relatively small optimal sizes. They tend not 
to rely on elaborate and expensive physical infrastructure of traffic, utilities and 
communication networks and make modest demands on the non-physical infrastructure, 
including the judiciary and educational systems. 
 
Although they may produce for foreign markets, these low technology sectors are relatively 
independent of globalization. Their economic success is only moderately linked to the speed 
and direction of the liberalisation of international trade. The low level of technology also 
reduces the need for protection of intellectual property rights and makes the impact of their 
violation on technology transfer an issue of secondary importance. The tried and tested 
technologies do not involve significant levels of calculable or incalculable technological risk. 
Similarly, the modest financial requirements of developing these sectors reduce both the 
importance of financial liberalisation and the impact of volatility of international financial 
markets. 
 
The impact of the decreasing external returns to scale of the low technology development 
strategy is not restricted to the economic sphere. It also has consequences for the economic 
geography and the role of the government. Because of the decreasing external returns to scale, 
the clustering of economic activity tends to be counter-productive. The more geographically 
concentrated production is, the higher the average costs of production will be, all else being 
equal. In a decentralized economic system, the uncoordinated individual decision making will 
tend to result in a geographically even distribution of economic activity. So disparities in 
geographical patterns of economic growth and income will tend to be small and there will not 
be a tendency towards excessive migration pressures. This greatly reduces the need for 
regional income re-distribution or for elaborate regional economic policies. 
 
As a consequence, the low technology development strategy does not require a strong and 
efficient political governance structure. The services a government may provide are, from an 
economic perspective, not overly important. There is no strong need for enhancing human 
capital through education or for providing a relatively up-to-date infrastructure. Nor is there a 
need for the regional redistributing of income or for regional development policies. The 
relative insulation from the effects of globalisation also reduce the need for a competent and 
forward looking foreign policy on trade and other issues. Finally, the low dependence on 
financial resources and foreign technologies reduce the reliance on international investors and 
the need to pay attention to their nervousness regarding various forms of political risks.  
 
High technology strategy 
 
For a development strategy that focuses on the adoption and development of high technology 
production processes the opposite holds. These processes, which often are knowledge 
intensive, show the increasing internal returns to scale that are normally associated with 
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research and development. High technology sectors also have increasing external returns to 
scale, partially because of their reliance on a well-developed physical and non-physical 
infrastructure. The demands on physical infrastructure relate to swift and reliable connections 
with the rest of the world, both physically through roads, railways, harbours and airports, and 
virtually through modern information and communication technologies. The need for experts 
requires the presence of a high quality merit-based education system. There is a need for well-
connected and internationally recognized universities and research institutes that are able and 
willing to communicate relevant scientific progress to the local industry. 
 
Given the global character of high-technology sectors, embracing globalisation is crucial for 
this development strategy. It requires governments to accept and implement global treaties on 
trade and on intellectual property rights. As high technology sectors typically produce for 
international markets, trade liberalisation and an internationally level playing field are 
important for the success of the strategy, despite the efforts of some governments to protect 
their domestic markets in an effort to grow national champions in specific sectors. 
Furthermore, the importance of international cooperation in research and development make 
the adherence to treaties on intellectual property rights crucial, as this is a pre-requisite both 
for the exchange of knowledge and ideas and for the transfer of technology. 
 
Financial liberalisation and openness are also important for a high technology oriented 
development strategy. Not only does this strategy require a substantial amount of financial 
resources, which some countries may find difficult to accumulate through domestic savings. 
The high levels of calculable and incalculable risk make it sensible and efficient to use the 
risk-sharing opportunities of the international financial system. This risk sharing leads to an 
increased dependence on international financial flows, both in the form of portfolio 
investment and in the form of foreign direct investment.  
 
A disadvantage of the geographical clustering caused by a high technology development 
strategy is that it creates disparities between regions within the country that may be difficult to 
manage. These disparities can include differences in income, employment, access to 
education, health services, local infrastructure, and individual freedoms. The disparities of 
such dual economy tend to lead to migration and self-selection effects that re-enforce existing 
differences. Left to its own devices, uncoordinated individual decision making is likely to 
result in an economic and social structure that is full of tensions that can easily get out of 
control. 
 
Therefore, apart from the economic requirements, a high technology development strategy 
requires a strong, competent government, which is capable of devising and implementing 
policies that reduce tensions and bridges the internal divide. The government must efficiently 
supply the appropriate infrastructure within the agglomerations, provide adequate education 
and create an environment in which internationally mobile experts feel comfortable and well 
at ease. It needs to engage in development strategies for the regions of the country that are not 
part of the successful clusters and implement a regional redistribution of income. It must 
direct internal migration flow in ways that support the growth and development of clusters, 
rather than hamper it. 
 
There also will be a need to build consensus for and conduct a foreign and trade policy that 
embraces the process of globalisation, e.g. by skilfully negotiating and adhering to 
international, regional and bilateral trade treaties. Given the reliance of the high technology 
development strategy on international finance, there is a need for providing a transparent and 
stable governance structure. International investors‟ nervousness with respect to political risk 
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needs to be taken seriously, as a reversal of financial flows may have catastrophic effects on 
the success of the development strategy.  
 
Given the different requirements the two development strategies make on the government, 
weak and instable governments may be justified in their preference for following isolationist 
impulses and for setting unambitious targets for economic growth and development. Their 
weakness creates an environment in which an ambitious high-technology development 
strategy would suffer from the political and policy risks and, therefore, would be 
inappropriate. Strong, competent and stable governments, on the other hand, may well be 
encouraged to embrace globalisation and the chances it offers for achieving the high growth 
rates that are associated with a high technology oriented development strategy. 
 
The main characteristics of the two development strategies are illustrated in the diagrams in 
the next section. Before turning to the graphical analysis, the intricacies of decision making 
under the uncertainties involved in the two development strategies are discussed.  
 
 
 
3. Political Risk and Ambiguity 
 
When speaking about uncertainty, economists almost without exception refer to calculable 
risk. This reflects the usefulness of the separation of beliefs from the evaluation of outcomes 
that characterizes the subjective expected utility approach. The possibility of such a separation 
on the basis of an objective axiomatic foundation was convincingly shown by Savage (1954) 
and Anscombe and Aumann (1963). On the basis of their work one can easily be led to 
believe that for all practical purposes uncertainty can be represented by subjective probability 
distributions. The refutation of the “Sure Thing Principle” by the thought experiment in 
Ellsberg (1961) would seem nothing but one of many irrelevant oddities and paradoxes. In 
reality, it shows a systematic aversion for situations in which probabilities are unknown and, 
therefore, risks are incalculable. 
 
In the Ellsberg Paradox choices need to be made between bets with known probabilities and 
bets with unknown probabilities. For this purpose, consider an urn containing 90 balls. The 
colours of the balls are blue, red or yellow. The urn contains 30 blue balls; the remaining 60 
balls are red or yellow in an unknown proportion. In the first instance, the choice is offered 
between two bets, B1 and B2. B1 pays £ 100 if the ball drawn from the urn is blue, and nothing 
otherwise. Similarly, B2 pays £ 100 if the ball is yellow. When faced with the choice between 
B1 and B2, B1 is typically chosen, implying that the subjective probability of a blue ball 
exceeds that of a yellow ball.  
 
 Blue Red Yellow 
Number of balls 30 60 
B1 £100 £0 £0 
B2 £0 £0 £100 
B3 £100 £0 
B4 £0 £100 
 
 
Next the bets B3 and B4 are considered, where B3 pays £100 if the ball is either blue or red and 
nothing if it is yellow. B4 pays £ 100 if the ball is either red or yellow. Once again, faced with 
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a choice between B3 and B4, the bet with the known probabilities, B4, is chosen. So the 
subjective probability of {either a red or a yellow ball} exceeds that of {either a blue or a red 
ball}. This implies that the subjective probability of a blue ball must be less than the 
subjective probability of a yellow ball, contradicting the result of the first comparison. 
Therefore, the decision maker cannot have been a subjective expected utility maximizer. 
 
Compelling as thinking of the Ellsberg Paradox as an irrelevant oddity may seem, it misses 
the point. The difference between (calculable) risk and (incalculable) ambiguity, as discussed 
in an early stage by Knight (1921) and Keynes (1909/21), is more than a mirage. It is this 
fundamental difference that is reflected in the Ellsberg Paradox. What is more, after the work 
by Schmeidler (1982/89) the type of solution proposed by Ellsberg (1961) can no longer be 
criticized as “ad hoc”. Rather, Schmeidler provided it with a decision-theoretic foundation as 
solid as that of the subjective expected utility approach. 
 
Uncertainty: Risk and Ambiguity 
 
So what exactly is meant by incalculable risk or ambiguity? Perhaps the clearest explanation 
is provided by Keynes (1937). Keynes states: 
 
“By „uncertain‟ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish 
what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not 
subject, in this sense, to uncertainty [...]. The sense in which I am using the term 
is that [...] there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability 
whatever. We simply do not know.” 
[pp. 113-114] 
 
Keynes than continues to discuss its implications 
 
“Now a practical theory of the future [...] has certain marked characteristics. In 
particular, being based on so flimsy a foundation, it is subject to sudden and 
violent changes. The practise of calmness and immobility, of certainty and 
security, suddenly breaks down. New fears and hopes will, without warning, take 
charge of human conduct. The forces of disillusion may suddenly impose a new 
conventional basis of valuation. All these pretty, polite techniques, made for a 
well-panelled board room and a nicely regulated market are liable to collapse. At 
all times vague panic fears and equally vague and unreasoned hopes are not really 
lulled, and lie but a little way below the surface.” 
[pp. 114-115] 
 
To him, these implications are not without consequences for economic theory 
 
“[T]he fact that our knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, 
renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of the classical 
economic theory. This theory might work very well in a world in which economic 
goods are necessarily consumed within a short interval of their being produced. 
But it requires, I suggest, considerable amendment if it is to be applied to a world 
in which the accumulation of wealth for an indefinitely postponed future is an 
important factor; and the greater the proportionate part played by such wealth 
accumulation the more essential does such amendment become.” 
[p. 113] 
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When facing the decision between a low technology development strategy and a strategy that 
focuses on high technology, policy makers face various forms of (calculable) risk and of 
(incalculable) ambiguity. Some of the ambiguity is inherent in the development and 
implementation of high technology processes, as the country may not have had the 
opportunity to gain experience with them. Indeed, the lack of relevant past experience on the 
basis of which to form reasonable (subjective) probability estimates is what Knight (1921) 
considers the basic cause of ambiguity. 
 
Another source of ambiguity, which is most relevant for developing and emerging economies, 
is political uncertainty. It is easy to imagine how changes in the confidence of international 
investors in the behaviour and stability of governments can lead to unpredictable reactions of 
international financial markets. It may lead investors, seemingly without proper regard for the 
unchanged fundamentals, to radically change their valuation of assets or reverse long standing 
financial flows. In similar ways incalculable risk may affect the behaviour of other decision 
makers directly or indirectly involved in the implementation of the chosen development 
strategy.  
 
To develop an intuition for how the impact of (incalculable) ambiguity on the decision 
process may differ from that of (calculable) risk, we compare both situations below. For this 
purpose we consider a variation of the familiar risk premium, which equals the difference 
between the expected value of a random variable and the certain value which leads to an 
outcome the decision maker considers as equally good. It is compared with an overall 
uncertainty premium, which also takes ambiguity into account. The difference between the 
two premiums reflects the impact of ambiguity. 
 
The Risk Premium 
 
When one has found a way to make incalculable risk, i.e. ambiguity, calculable, defining the 
counterpart of a risk premium is a straight forward task. Focusing on the effect of ambiguity 
by considering a risk neutral decision maker was done in Spanjers (1999/08, Section 8.4). The 
same approach is followed in this paper to analyse the impact of ambiguity on the evaluation 
of the two development strategies outlined above. 
 
Consider a risk neutral decision maker who faces two possible outcomes for the amount of 
financial resources available for implementing the development strategy. This amount is 
either low, xmin, or high, xmax. The valuation of the two strategies is depicted in Diagram 1.  
 
In Diagram 1 we have two indirect production functions. The function f depicts the output of a 
low technology development strategy as a function of the financial resources available. It is an 
indirect production function. It implicitly incorporates the equilibrium of the interactions 
between both private sector and political decision makers for an overall amount of available 
financial resources x. This equilibrium comprises behaviour in all relevant aspects under the 
assumption that the low technology strategy is followed. Similarly, the function g is an 
indirect production function depicting the output when a high technology strategy is pursued 
and financial resources x are available. 
 
The ratio of probabilities with which the financial resources xmin and xmax are obtained 
corresponds to the ratio of the distance between xmax and E{x} to the distance between xmin and 
E{x}. The loss in average output caused by the risk regarding the availability of  
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g(xmin) 
g(E{x}) 
E{g(x)} 
g(xmax) 
f(x) 
f(xmin) 
E{f(x)} 
f(E{x}) 
f(xmax) 
(E{f(x)}) 
(E{g(x)}) 
 
Diagram 1:  Low technology strategy vs high technology strategy under risk 
 
 
E{x} xmax xmin 
g(x) 
xmax E{x} xmin 
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financial resources, as compared to the output that would be obtained if the average financial 
resource was available with certainty, is obtained on the vertical output axis as 
 
f(E{x}) - E{f(x)}. 
 
If the return for the risk-neutral investors is proportional to output generated, the risk has a 
negative effect on returns when the low technology strategy is followed. This is the direct 
analogue of the expected utility of a risk averse investor for an investment strategy with has a 
linear indirect production function.  
 
The same expected output could have been obtained when financial resources of σ(E{f(x)}) 
would be available with certainty, the counter part of the certainty equivalent in for a risk 
averse investor. Similarly, we obtain the analogue of the risk premium for the low technology 
strategy as 
 
     E{x} - σ(E{f(x)}), 
 
reflecting loss due to the risk, expressed as a reduction in available financial resources. 
 
The lower panel of Diagram 1 depicts the high technology strategy. Its indirect production 
function has increasing returns to scale. As before, the impact of risk on the investors‟ return 
is obtained as the difference between the output for the average financial resources available 
and the average of the risky output, i.e. 
 
g(E{x}) - E{g(x)}. 
 
Since the indirect production function has increasing returns to scale the average return of the 
high-technology strategy exceeds the return of the average of the available financial 
resources.  
 
Denoting the analogue of the certainty equivalent of the high technology strategy by 
σ(E{g(x)}), we obtain 
 
     E{x} - σ(E{g(x)}) 
 
as the (negative) equivalent reduction in available financial resources due to risk, i.e. the 
equivalent gain in available financial resources due to risk. Therefore, the presence of risk 
increases the average return of the risk neutral investors in the same way as risk increases the 
expected utility of a risk loving investor. 
 
Evaluating Ambiguity: The Choquet Expected Value 
 
The above discussion does not answer the question which strategy is preferred by a risk 
neutral investor or policy maker. The decision depends on the level of output or, in a dynamic 
context, the level of growth that is obtained for the competing strategies. This issue is 
addressed below in the discussion of Diagram 3 in Section 4. But first we turn our attention to 
the impact of ambiguity, which is depicted in Diagram 2. 
 
Before we can sensibly discuss the impact of ambiguity on the evaluation of the outcomes of 
the different development strategies, we have to describe the way in which ambiguity enters 
the trade-offs made by a decision maker. 
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In the case of risk, a decision maker is assumed to maximize his expected utility, i.e. the 
expected value of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u over the outcomes of the 
random variable described by the pair (p;y), where p describes the probabilities and y the 
outcomes for the states of nature. The decision maker‟s expected utility function is now 
obtained as 
 
   U(p;y) = Ep{u(y)}. 
 
When the decision maker is risk-neutral, as in the case we considered above, the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility index is a linear increasing function and the expected utility 
function U is equivalently represented by taking the expected value of y, i.e. to 
 
    Ep{y}. 
 
When considering decision making under ambiguity, the situation is more complex. The 
beliefs of the decision maker are no longer described by a vector of probabilities and, 
therefore, it is no longer possible to take an expected value of the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility index over the state-contingent outcomes y. 
 
In the simple case of two possible outcomes, each associated with one specific state of nature, 
the decision maker‟s ambiguous beliefs can be represented by the plausible lower bounds he 
places on the probability that the financial resources equal ymin and the probability that they 
are ymax. In particular, the assumption is abandoned that the sum of these lower bounds on the 
probabilities equals one. Therefore, this representation is more general than that of by a 
(subjective) probability distribution. In the context of this simple example, the available 
financial resources will be either ymin or ymax as before.  
 
An example of the first method to specify of such beliefs assumes that the probability that the 
available financial resources will be ymin is at least 0.25, whereas the probability of ymax is at 
least 0.5. Or, to put it differently, the decision maker considers all probability distributions in 
the range from  
 
0.25 ≤ Pr{y = ymin} ≤ 0.5  with  Pr{y = ymax} = 1 - Pr{y = ymin} 
to be plausible. 
 
Now that we have stated how the decision maker‟s ambiguous beliefs can be represented, the 
next question is how they can be used to evaluate outcomes. 
 
Obviously, there are many different ways in which a decision maker may choose to evaluate 
this kind of vague or “fuzzy” beliefs. As a general rule, however, it seems plausible to expect 
the decision maker to act cautiously, i.e. pessimistically. In the presence of a multitude of 
equally plausible probability distributions, this can be achieved by considering the lowest 
expected utility value that is compatible with one of the probability distributions that is 
considered to be plausible. The extreme version of this is the “Hurwicz Principle” (see 
Hurwicz, 1951, and Arrow and Hurwicz, 1972), and its result is known as the maxmin value 
for the multiple priors model axiomized by Schmeidler and Gilboa (1989). Here the decision 
maker chooses his actions z є Z to maximize the minimum value of his expected utility over 
the set of admissible “prior” probability distributions P, i.e. 
 
  maxz є Z [ minp є P  Ep{u(x(z))} ]. 
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An alternative approach would be to order the possible outcomes in a decreasing sequence 
with respect to the values they generate for the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u. 
Now one assigns the first, i.e. highest, utility value the minimum probability with which it is 
obtained. Next, one assigns the minimum remaining probability to the second utility value in 
the sequence etc. This leads to the Choquet expected value of the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility index as axiomized by Schmeidler (1982/89).
3
  
 
So how do these two approaches apply to our example? When following the maxmin 
approach, it is obvious that the higher the probability associated with ymin is, the lower the 
associated expected utility value will be. Therefore, the ambiguity averse decision maker will 
assign Pr{y = ymin} = 0.5 and will evaluate the outcome as 
 
   0.5 u(ymin) + 0.5 u(ymax). 
 
According to the Choquet expected utility approach, ymax is the first outcome in the decreasing 
sequence and ymin the second. Therefore, ymax will be assigned its lowest possible probability, 
which is 0.5. So now turn to ymin, which will be assigned the minimum with respect to the 
remaining probabilities. But because the assigned probabilities must add up to one, the only 
remaining probability is 0.5, which for that reason is also the lowest remaining probability. 
Therefore, the Choquet expected utility is obtained as 
 
   CE{u(y)} = 0.5 u(ymax) + 0.5 u(ymin)  
 
Regarding this example two remarks are in place. Firstly, in this specific case the maxmin 
approach and the Choquet expected utility approach lead to the same valuation of the 
ambiguous beliefs. This in not generally the case.
 4 
Secondly, it is easy to see that a decision 
maker who has to pay y, rather than receiving it, would evaluate the outcome as 
 
   CE{u(-y)} = 0.75 u(-ymax) + 0.25 u(-ymin). 
 
This property, that a change in the ranking of the outcomes obtained in different states of 
nature may affect the weights assigned to them, is a general property of evaluating outcomes 
in the presence of ambiguity. 
 
                                               
3 Formally, consider beliefs over a finite state-space S that are described by a set-function v: S→[0,1], such that 
(i) v(Ø) = 0 and v(S) = 1 and (ii) for all A and B, subsets of S with A containing B, we have v(A) ≥ v(B). Such set 
function v is called a capacity. Consider a real-valued function h that assigns each state s є S the value h(s). 
Consider a permutation t1,…,tS of states of S such that h(t1) ≥ … ≥ h(tS). Now the Choquet expected value of the 
function h with respect to the capacity v is obtained by taking the Choquet Integral of h over v and reads: 
 
CE{h }:= v(t1)h(t1) + [v({t1,t2})-v({t1})]h(t2) + [v({t1,t2,t3})-v({t1,t2)})]h(t3) + ... + [1-v(S)]h(tS). 
 
4 In general, the multiple prior approach and the Choquet expected utility approach may lead to different 
outcomes, but for ambiguity averse decision makers and specific shapes of the set of priors P – as considered in 
this paper – the results of the approaches coincide. Because the Choquet expected utility approach is easier to 
generalize, it is the preferred approach for deriving theoretical results. But as the multiple prior is more intuitive, 
it is the preferred approach for the purpose of exposition. A discussion of both approaches is provided in 
Spanjers (1999/08, Chapter 7). For an exposition of the intuition of the Choquet integral see Spanjers (1999/08, 
Section 7.2). A mathematical treatment of the Choquet integral as a “horizontal” integral as compared to the 
“vertical” Riemann integral is provided in König (1997). 
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Now that we have seen how decision makers‟ beliefs are represented and outcomes are 
evaluated in the presence of ambiguity, we return to the evaluation of the different 
development strategies. 
 
The Uncertainty Premium 
 
The impact of ambiguity on the evaluation of the two development strategies by a risk neutral 
and ambiguity averse decision maker is illustrated in Diagram 2. This diagram contains the 
information of Diagram 1, but extends it by including the Choquet expected value of the 
available financial resources and of the attained output. 
 
On the horizontal axis, the Choquet expected value of the available financial resources, 
CE{x}, is less than their expected value in the absence of ambiguity, E{x}. As outlined above, 
an ambiguity averse risk neutral decision maker puts the weight associated to xmax at the lower 
bound of its plausible probability value and, therefore, assigns the remaining probability mass 
to the only remaining outcome xmin. The Choquet expected evaluation of the output for the 
low technology strategy, CE{f(x)}, and for the high technology strategy, CE{g(x)}, are 
obtained in a similar way. 
 
As in the case of risk, the decreasing returns to scale of the indirect production function f 
cause the Choquet expected value of the output to be less than the output for the Choquet 
expected financial resources. The additional presence of ambiguity, as compared to risk, leads 
to a difference between the output for the expected value of financial resources and the 
Choquet expected value of the output of 
 
    f(E{x}) – CE{f(x)}. 
 
Thus, the difference due to the presence ambiguity is  
 
    E{f(x)} – CE{f(x)}. 
 
The certainty equivalent for the Choquet expected value of the output is indicated in Diagram 
2 as σC(CE{f(x)}).  
 
For the analogue of an uncertainty premium – which reflects the losses due to both the risk 
and the ambiguity expressed as a reduction in available financial resources – one obtains 
 
    E{x} – σC(CE{f(x)}). 
 
For the low technology strategy, the presence of ambiguity reinforces the effects of risk for a 
risk neutral and ambiguity averse decision maker. 
 
As the lower panel of Diagram 2 indicates, this is not the case for the high technology 
strategy. For the indirect production function g for the high technology development strategy, 
which has increasing returns to scale, the difference between the output for the expected value 
of the available financial resources and the Choquet expected value of the output is 
 
    g(E{x}) – CE{g(x)}. 
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Diagram 2:  Low technology strategy and high technology strategy under ambiguity 
 
 
 
xmax E{x} xmin 
xmin E{x} xmax 
g(x) 
16 
 
So the difference due to the presence of ambiguity is 
 
    E{g(x)} – CE{g(x)}. 
 
The certainty equivalent for the Choquet expected output is denoted by σC(CE{g(x)}). For the 
analogue of an uncertainty premium – which reflects the loss due to both risk and ambiguity 
expressed as an equivalent (possibly negative) reduction in available financial resources – one 
obtains 
 
    E{x} – σC(CE{g(x)}). 
 
As the diagram indicates, for the high technology strategy the presence of ambiguity 
counteracts the (positive) impact of risk. 
 
The intuition for this is that the increasing returns to scale of the indirect production function 
g has a similar effect as a risk loving von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index would have. 
The valuation of the output of the risky financial resources exceeds that of the output for their 
expected value. The ambiguity aversion, however, reduces the valuation of the ambiguous 
output below the valuation of the output its absence. Therefore, the impact of ambiguity is 
qualitatively different from that of risk. 
 
The above discussion of the impact of ambiguity on the indirect production functions of the 
low technology and the high technology strategy focused on a static analysis of output levels. 
The main interest of policy makers and investors, however, is in the middle and long term 
effects of these strategies, which requires an analysis in a dynamic setting. In order to address 
these effects, the next section focuses on growth rates.  
 
 
 
4. Growth 
 
In this section we focus of our attention on growth rates. We start by extending the above 
discussion of the impact of ambiguity to the growth of output. Then we present per capita 
growth rates of selected developing and emerging countries from different parts of the world. 
In this data we look for indications that the data is in line with our theoretical findings, both 
regarding the two proto-typical development strategies and regarding the potential impact of 
ambiguity on the choice of development strategy. 
 
Ambiguity and Growth 
 
The growth rates associated with the two development strategies are depicted in Diagram 3. In 
line with the previous section, the diagram displays the growth rate as an indirect function of 
the available financial resources. The functions F and G are indirect growth functions. Thus, 
F(x) is the growth rate that results from the interactions of the relevant decision makers when 
financial resources of size x are available and a low technology development strategy is 
followed. Similarly, G is the indirect growth function associated with the high technology 
strategy. 
 
The impact of individual developing and emerging economies on worldwide technological 
progress is limited. Although technological progress is largely exogenous for these countries, 
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G(xmax) 
G(xmin) 
F(xmin) 
E{G(x)} 
CE{F(x)} 
CE{G(x)} 
E{F(x)} 
F(xmax) 
they can benefit from worldwide technological progress. This is reflected in the shape of the 
indirect growth functions. 
 
The growth rate generated by a low technology strategy is assumed to be positive but not very 
high. This seems reasonable, as technological progress in low technology sectors is likely to 
be slow and to be characterized by marginal reductions in production costs. If the country 
does not have the financial recourses to upgrade to the newest technology, one would expect 
that the profit margins and wages would fall. But variable production costs would remain 
below the international price level and production would continue. A temporarily limited 
access to financial resources would reduce growth, perhaps even making it negative, but it 
would be unlikely to trigger an economic crisis. Similarly, an abundance of financial 
resources would create the opportunity of increased growth rates, but only to a limited extend. 
Even considerable additional investments would be unlikely to result in a significant increase 
in competitiveness and would be unlikely to cause competitors to significantly reduce their 
output or leave the market.  
 
Diagram 3:  Growth for the low technology strategy and the high technology strategy under  
   ambiguity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xmax 
G(x) 
F(x) 
E{x} 
CE{x} 
xmin 
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The properties of a high technology strategy are in sharp contrast to this. The growth obtained 
through a high technology strategy is likely to be high when the strategy is successful, but 
failure may well result in an economic crisis. The technological progress in high technology 
sectors is likely to be both rapid and revolutionary, meaning that new production technologies 
make existing technologies obsolete.  
 
As long as a country following a high technology strategy has access to sufficient financial 
resources, it will be able to keep up with technological progress. It will be able to maintain its 
position in the international market and to benefit from generous profit margins. But if the 
access to financial resources is temporarily limited, this may have serious consequences. The 
crucial ongoing research and development will be interrupted, causing a rapid loss of market 
share. As a result of the increasing internal and/or external returns to scale average production 
costs increase, reducing competitiveness even further.  
 
An abundance of financial resources, on the other hand, may increase the growth rate above 
its already high level. This increase, however, will be at a decreasing rate. When the 
production frontier is approached, further increases in growth rates require large financial 
commitments. Furthermore, the processes and infrastructural projects that lead to external 
increasing returns to scale take time to plan and implement. The time-span of the temporary 
abundance of financial resources may be shorter than the implementation lags associated with 
these projects and processes.  
 
The shape of the indirect growth functions F and G in Diagram 3 reflects these 
considerations. 
 
Diagram 3 depicts a situation in which a policy maker with the objective of maximizing 
expected growth rates chooses a high technology development strategy. The expected growth 
rate of such strategy, E{G(x)}, exceeds that of a development strategy that focuses on low 
technology sectors, E{F(x)}. As discussed above, a drawback of the high technology strategy 
is its vulnerability to unfavourable international developments. The growth rate is more 
volatile and every once in a while an economic crisis is will occur. The policy maker may be 
tempted to follow a low technology strategy, “prudently” avoiding economic crises. In a 
situation as depicted in Diagram 3, the cost of avoiding economics crises, however, is high. In 
the long run, the associated reduction in the growth rate leads to a standard of living that is 
less than it could have been. 
 
When risk neutral but ambiguity averse policy makers and investors face ambiguity in the 
form of incalculable political risk, the situation becomes even worse. In their decision 
making, these decision makers put an increased weight on bad outcomes. In the situation 
depicted in Diagram 3, the weight on xmin is increased at the expense of the weight assigned to 
xmax. Therefore, the resulting Choquet expected growth rate is reduced for both development 
strategies. But this is not the only consequence of the presence of ambiguity. The reduced 
availability of financial resources associated with xmin “merely” leads to a reduced growth 
rate, F(xmin), for a low technology strategy, whereas it leads to a full-blown economic crises if 
a high technology strategy is pursued, indicated by G(xmin). As a consequence, the presence of 
ambiguity can reverse the order of the valuation of the two development strategies. It may 
cause a low technology development strategy to be pursued where a high technology strategy 
would have been better, the distortion being caused by the pessimism and excessive 
cautiousness of the risk neutral but ambiguity averse policy makers and investors. 
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This possibility that the presence of ambiguity, as caused by incalculable political risk, may 
lead policy makers and investors to pursue inappropriate development strategies, is 
sufficiently worrying to warrant a brief examination of selected annual per capita GDP growth 
rates, looking for indications that this actually happens in real life decision making. 
 
Growth Rates of Selected Countries and Regions 
 
We examine annual per capita GDP growth rates in our search for indications that the 
presence of incalculable (political) risk has a distorting effect on the development strategies of 
emerging countries. We focus on emerging countries rather than low income developing 
countries, as they are more likely to satisfy the basic pre-requisites for a high technology 
strategy. Emerging countries are more likely to have a real choice between a low technology 
and a high technology development strategy. 
 
Four groups of countries are considered. The first group of countries is from East Asia. For 
the purpose of comparison we also look at two groups countries of from other parts of the 
world, viz. South America and North Africa. The fourth group consists of the BRIC-countries 
excluding Brazil (which is included in the group of South American countries), viz. China, 
India and Russia. For each of these groups we examine World Bank‟s World Development 
Indicator data on the annual growth rate of per capita GDP for the period from 1975 to 2005. 
 
For the geographical area of East Asia we focus on Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. 
The per capita growth rates for these countries are depicted in Figure 1. Interestingly, in the  
 
Figure 1: Per capita GDP growth rates for East Asia 
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period before the East Asian crisis of 1997, the growth rates of these countries are well above 
the average of the middle income countries. Before the 1990s the growth rates also show a 
fair amount of volatility, as would be expected for a high technology strategy. From the early 
1990s until the crisis in 1997, the growth rates where stable and well above the average of the 
20 
 
middle income countries. Once again, this is in line with what we would expect for a high 
technology oriented development strategy. 
 
After the crisis, however, we find that growth rates have stabilized and no longer exceed the 
average of the middle income countries. Our theoretical analysis makes it tempting to 
interpret this as the consequence of an increase in the perceived incalculable risks of global 
financial flows. It would be capable of reversing the valuation of the two development 
strategies, causing a shift from a high technology to a low technology development strategy. 
 
The second geographical area we look is South America, where Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
are selected. During the last three decades South America has seen many economic crises, 
which could potentially be a consequence of a high technology strategy. Our theoretical 
analysis suggests that if such a strategy is followed, these countries would be vulnerable to 
crises, but would also display periods of high economic growth. The annual per capita growth 
rates for these countries are depicted in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Per capita GDP growth rates for South America 
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The data in Figure 2 provide no indication that a high technology strategy has been followed. 
In particular the growth rates of Brazil and Mexico are below, rather than above the average 
per capita growth rates for middle income countries. Besides, from the beginning of the 1990s 
these growth rates are relatively stable, suggesting that the two countries follow low 
technology development strategies. Only Argentina exhibits high and volatile growth rates in 
the period from the early 1990s onward. But the high growth in the early 1990s may well be a 
rebounce from the economic crisis in the preceding years, whereas the crises at the beginning 
of the 21
st
 century lasted longer than one would be led to expect. 
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For North Africa, the per capita growth rates of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are 
depicted in Figure 3. With the exception of Tunisia, where the growth rate was volatile, the 
growth rates of the selected counties are more or less in line with the average of the middle 
income counties and relatively stable. This suggests that these countries are following a low 
technology strategy. The decision in favour of a low technology strategy may well be driven 
by the incalculable political risk related to the Middle East. Ambiguity averse policy makers 
would be expected to follow such strategy, even if the proximity to and treaties with the 
European Union would seem to make a high technology oriented development strategy a 
more than promising alternative. 
 
Figure 3: Per capita GDP growth rates for North-Africa 
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Finally, we have a brief look at the per capita growth rates of the BRIC counties excluding 
Brazil, viz. Russia, India and China. From Figure 2, it seems that from the early 1990‟s 
onward the growth rate of Brazil is relatively stable and more or less in line with the average 
growth rate of the middle income countries. Figure 4 suggests that the same holds for India 
from the beginning of the 1980s onwards. Both countries seem to follow a low technology 
development strategy. The growth rates for China, by contrast, seem to indicate that since the 
early 1980s it has been following a high technology oriented development strategy. 
 
From the data in Figure 4 it is difficult to judge if Russia is following a low technology or a 
high technology strategy. The growth rates of the early 1990s may well be dominated by the 
effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The growth rates in the 21
st
 century are slightly 
above the average for the middle income countries but seem rather stable. In the light of our 
theoretical arguments, this would be compatible with a low technology development strategy 
with enhanced growth rates due to increases in the price oil. As in the case of North Africa, 
this may be the consequence of incalculable political risks. Given the geographical proximity 
to the European Union, it would seem that in the absence of this ambiguity, a high technology 
development strategy would be warranted. 
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Figure 4: Per capita GDP growth rates for China, India and Russia 
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The above discussion of growth rates seems to illustrate our theoretical arguments. This is 
particularly true for the impact of ambiguity, be it caused by incalculable political risk or by 
the possibility of unpredictable reversals of international financial flows.  
 
 
 
5. Policy Recommendations 
 
The brief and superficial inspection of growth rates illustrates the general theoretical analysis 
of this paper. It suggests that the presence of ambiguity distorts the decisions of policy makers 
and investors in a number of countries and regions. For these countries and regions the 
presence of ambiguity may have led to low technology oriented development strategies where 
high technology strategies would have been more appropriate. Is this inevitable, or are there 
ways of correcting this unfortunate situation? 
 
The first sort of policy measures one would be looking for are measures that either remove the 
sources of ambiguity or insulate the development strategies from their effects. Therefore, the 
answers may depend on the source of the ambiguity. 
 
In the case of the incalculable political risks in the Middle East, which seem to affect the 
development strategies of the countries in North Africa, a comprehensive peace agreement 
would tackle the problem at its root. This, however, is an issue of international politics, the 
solution of which lies outside the realm of economics. Given the cause of this ambiguity, 
there seems to be little in the way of devising (international) economic institutions that can 
remove its impact. Indeed, some may argue that low technology oriented development 
strategies in this region respond to the calculable risk of the conflict escalating, rather than 
mere ambiguity. 
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Something similar may apply to the incalculable political risks in Russia. Although some 
form of the rule of law has been re-introduced under the Putin presidencies, it is generally 
believed that the independence of legislative and judicial spheres from the executive has not 
yet been established. This is were the root of the incalculable political risks in Russia lies, and 
which makes it vulnerable to the political risks that are associated with individual persons and 
their supporters. The re-introduction of the rule of law has significantly reduced the 
incalculable political risk associated with the Yeltsin presidencies. Still, the removal of the 
remaining political risk is likely to be a long term project for Russian politicians and 
governments. Integrating Russia in regional and (strengthened) international governance 
structures would be likely to help, but it is difficult to see how (international) economic 
institutions can be devised that reduce the impact of the current incalculable political risks. 
 
This leaves us with the ambiguity that is caused by unpredictable reversals of international 
financial flows, which seems to affect the East Asian countries. This incalculable risk is 
inherent in the process of globalisation, but it can more easily be dealt with than the political 
risks discussed above. Our theoretical analysis suggests that it is a temporary shortage of 
financial resources that leads to crises like the East Asian crisis of 1997. It may be difficult to 
prevent a panic amongst investors – be it enhanced by speculators or not – but it is possible to 
develop national policies and international institutions that are capable of cushioning the 
impact of a sudden and temporary reversal of financial flows.  
 
A tried and tested national policy to reduce the impact of a reversal of financial flows is the 
accumulation of large currency reserves, a policy that is currently being implemented by most 
East Asian countries. On the international level, there already exists an institution whose task 
it is to cushion the impact of sudden and temporary reversals of financial flows, viz. the 
International Monetary Fund. Unfortunately, the instruments it currently has at its disposal 
seem to be inadequate for the task. An appropriate reform of the IMF would do much to 
reduce the impact of the ambiguity caused by unpredictable reversals of international 
financial flows. It would potentially encourage some countries in East Asia and beyond to 
abandon their current low technology oriented development strategies for more promising 
high technology strategies. 
 
Surely, this kind of “insurance” against the sudden reversal of financial flows would lead to 
higher volatility and to an increase in the number of economic (almost) crises involving 
emerging economies. But this would not be the despicable consequence of a moral hazard 
problem. Rather, it would bring the amount of economic crises closer to its optimal level by 
removing a source of ambiguity that leads to excessively cautious behaviour by international 
investors and policy makers. 
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